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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Gabriel Hinders challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
obtained from a warrantless search of his father’s vehicle, which Mr. Hinders had permission to
drive. On appeal, Mr. Hinders argued the district court erred by denying his motion because
Deputy Edwards, the police officer who searched the vehicle, did not have any lawful basis to
enter the vehicle without a warrant. In response, the State argues Deputy Edwards’s search was
justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. This Reply Brief is necessary
to address the application of the automobile exception and other related issues.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were articulated in Mr. Hinders’s
Appellant’s Brief. (App. Br., pp.1–5.) They are not repeated here, but are incorporated by
reference.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hinders’s motion to suppress?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hinders’s Motion To Suppress
In Mr. Hinders’s Appellant’s Brief, he argued the district court should have granted his
motion to suppress because the State failed to justify the warrantless search of the vehicle with
any exception to the warrant requirement. (App. Br., pp.7–11.) Mr. Hinders maintained the
automobile exception was inapplicable; Deputy Edwards’s statutory authority allowed him to, at
most, remove and store the vehicle; the district court created a new exception to the warrant
requirement; and, if a search to determine vehicle ownership was “reasonable,” it did not allow
Deputy Edwards to enter the vehicle again and again once he located the vehicle’s registration.
(App. Br., pp.7–11.) In response, the State argues the district court implicitly determined and
properly applied the automobile exception. (Resp. Br., pp.6–11.) Mr. Hinders respectfully
disagrees.
First, the State never argued in the district court that Deputy Edwards could search the
vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception. To be sure, Mr. Hinders argued in his first
memorandum in support of his motion to suppress that the automobile exception did not apply,
(R., pp.54–55), but the burden is on the State to establish an exception to the warrant
requirement. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485 (2007). The State did not meet its burden with
the respect to the automobile exception. In the district court, the State only argued Mr. Hinders
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, 1 the community caretaking

1

On appeal, the State does not challenge the district court ruling that Mr. Hinders had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. (Tr. Vol. I, p.58, L.23–p.59, L.8.)
The first transcript, cited as Volume I, contains the hearing on Mr. Hinders’s motion to
suppress, a hearing with the district court’s oral decision on Mr. Hinders’s suppression motion,
and a change of plea hearing. The second transcript, cited as Volume II, contains the sentencing
hearing.
3

exception allowed the search, and the items were in plain view. (R., pp.59–63, 91–92.) These
arguments are simply not the automobile exception. Accordingly, the State cannot argue, for the
first time on appeal, the automobile exception justifies the warrantless search. See State v.
Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275 (2017).
Next, even though the State did not argue it below, the State submits the district court,
“while not precisely articulated,” ruled the automobile exception allowed the warrantless search
of the vehicle. The record does not support the State’s position. In the district court’s oral ruling,
it did not explicitly or implicitly hold the automobile exception applied. (See generally Tr. Vol. I,
p.56, L.18–p.60, L.25.) The district court did not reference the legal standards for the automobile
exception or determine Deputy Edwards had probable cause that evidence of a crime would be
found in the vehicle. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.56, L.18–p.60, L.25.) Instead, the district court crafted a
new exception to the warrant requirement based on “reasonableness”: the district court held it
was reasonable for Deputy Edwards to search the vehicle to determine the owner and whether it
was truly abandoned. (Tr. Vol. I, p.59, L.22–p.60, L.25.) Mr. Hinders submits the district court’s
ruling is not an application of the automobile exception. Therefore, not only was this issue never
raised by the State, it was never considered by the district court.
Assuming the automobile exception is properly before this Court for review, it does not
apply. The State contends the automobile exception allows the police to search a vehicle if the
police have “probable cause to believe the vehicle could be abandoned.” (Resp. Br., pp.8–10.)
The State thus claims Deputy Edwards had the authority to search the vehicle “to investigate” the
abandonment. (Resp. Br., pp.8–10.) This is not the standard for the automobile exception. The
automobile exception allows the police to search a vehicle if they have probable cause to believe
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evidence of a crime or contraband will be found in the vehicle. E.g., State v. Kelley, 159 Idaho
417, 427 (Ct. App. 2015).
First of all, abandonment of a vehicle is not a crime. See I.C. §§ 49-1801 to -1819.
Abandonment is “prohibited” by statute, and, consequently, the owner of the abandoned vehicle
is liable to pay for its removal, storage, and disposition. I.C. § 49-1802. But the owner is not
guilty of a felony or misdemeanor offense simply for abandoning a vehicle.
Second, the penalty provisions attendant to the abandonment of a vehicle are not
applicable here. The relevant chapter on towing and storage of abandoned vehicles contains two
penalty provisions: (1) an individual is guilty of a misdemeanor if he removes the towed vehicle
without payment; and (2) an individual is guilty of a traffic infraction if he fails to redeem his
removed vehicle within seven days, unless he filed a release of liability. I.C. §§ 49-1802(3),
-1813. Mr. Hinders had neither removed his vehicle without paying nor failed to redeem it within
seven days. Thus, these penalty provisions did not allow Deputy Edwards to search the vehicle
for evidence of these violations. Unless and until Mr. Hinders committed or attempted to commit
one of these acts, Deputy Edwards could do nothing more than comply with the statutory
regulations for a vehicle’s removal, which does not allow a search. (See App. Br., pp.9–10.)
Third, even if abandonment of a vehicle was a crime, Mr. Hinders had not abandoned the
vehicle yet. An abandoned vehicle is defined as a vehicle left for twenty-four hours or longer.
I.C. § 49-102(1)–(2). Mr. Hinders left the vehicle on the same day as Deputy Edwards’s
“investigation.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.37, Ls.10–12.) Moreover, the district court’s factual findings do not
establish “extraordinary circumstances,” as defined by statute, to allow the vehicle’s immediate
removal. I.C. §§ 49-106(11), -1803A. The district court found the vehicle was “to some degree
blocking the ability to freely move around by vehicles and even pedestrians, to some
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degree, . . . .” (Tr. Vol. I, p.56, Ls.24–25.) This partial blockage finding is supported by Deputy
Edwards’s photograph of the vehicle during his search:

(R., p.74.) As evidenced by this photograph, and the district court’s findings, this vehicle is not
an emergency, endangering the public, a hazard, blocking or impeding traffic, or potentially
impeding emergency vehicles. Further, Deputy Edwards clearly did not believe an extraordinary
circumstance existed or else he would have initiated immediate removal proceedings to ensure
emergency vehicles could safely enter or to neutralize the “hazard.” Thus, Deputy Edwards did
not have probable cause of a crime to justify his warrantless search.
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Fourth, even if abandonment of a vehicle was a crime and Mr. Hinders committed it,
Deputy Edwards did not have probable cause to believe evidence of that crime would be found in
the vehicle. The presence of the abandoned vehicle is the crime. Either the owner is present or he
is not. Investigation to determine the owner is not a search to find evidence of the crime of
abandonment. Therefore, the automobile exception did not justify the search because there was
no evidence to be found inside the vehicle of the “crime” at issue.
Finally, as argued in Mr. Hinders’s Appellant’s Brief, Deputy Edwards exceeded the
scope of a lawful search. (App. Br., p.11.) Mr. Hinders agrees with the State’s position that the
scope of the search is defined by the object of the search and places in which it may be found.
(Resp. Br., p.11.) Assuming it was permissible under the automobile exception to search for the
vehicle’s registration or owner information as evidence of a crime, Deputy Edwards went beyond
the scope of the search once he found the vehicle’s registration during his first entry into the
vehicle. There was no other evidence of this crime to be found once the registration was located.
Nor does the registration provide probable cause for another crime to continue searching the
vehicle. Even if it was permissible for Deputy Edwards to enter the vehicle a second time after
he was unable to contact the owner, Deputy Edwards did not stop there. Deputy Edwards entered
the vehicle at least one more time and only then did he see the contraband in plain view. 2
(Tr. Vol. I, p.20, L.24–p.21, L.9, p.45, L.20–p.46, L.3.) By that time, Deputy Edwards had
exceeded the permissible scope of the search. Because Deputy Edwards was not in a location that
he had a right to be when he saw the contraband, the plain view exception did not allow the

2

There was no evidence that Deputy Edwards saw the contraband during his first two searches
of the vehicle. (Tr. Vol. I, p.17, L.8–p.19, L.13, p.20, Ls.4–15, p.20, L.19–p.21, L.9; see also
Tr. Vol. I, p.58, Ls.5–15 (district court’s findings).)
7

seizure of the contraband. See State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 629 (2008) (discussing the plain
view doctrine).
For these reasons, and those stated in the Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Hinders submits the
district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hinders respectfully requests this Court reverse or vacate the district court’s order
denying his motion to suppress, vacate his withheld judgment, and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 4th day of September, 2018.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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